The history of Pakistan can not be understood without studying the part of its service. Since the country’s commencement in 1947, generals have been at the center of power, impacting politics, governance, and foreign policy. Zaheer Ahmad Meer, in his work “ The Generals of Pakistan, ” provides a critical account of how Pakistan’s generals came not only protectors of the borders but also autocrats of the state. This metamorphosis of the army from a professional defense force into a political institution has shaped Pakistan’s fortune for over seven decades.
The book explores the personalities of crucial generals, their rise to power, and the consequences of their opinions. It also highlights how weak mercenary institutions, judicial negotiations, and transnational alignments allowed the service to dominate Pakistan’s politics. To understand Pakistan moment, one must readdress the trip of its generals.
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At independence, Pakistan inherited a fragile structure. It entered only a small share of coffers, including the fortified forces. The Pakistan Army began under British command, with General Sir Frank Messervy as the first Commander- in- Chief, followed by General Sir Douglas Gracey. These British officers laid the foundation of the institution but maintained social traditions that gave the service a sense of superiority over civilians.
During this early period, Pakistan faced massive exile heads, violent collaborative screams, and the first war over Kashmir( 1947 – 48). These challenges elevated the army’s significance in state affairs. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, still, was clear in his vision the service was to remain inferior to mercenary authority. In his 1948 speech at Quetta Staff College, Jinnah reminded officers that policy opinions belonged to civilians, not generals.
Yet, after Jinnah’s death in September 1948 and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, mercenary leadership weakened dramatically. This vacuum came an opening for the service to expand its influence.
The appointment of General Muhammad Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s first native Commander- in- Chief in 1951 marked a turning point. Ambitious and politically shrewd, Ayub erected strong ties with the bureaucracy and foreign abettors , particularly the United States.
Soon after Ayub’s appointment, Pakistan witnessed the Rawalpindi Conspiracy , an tried achievement led by Major General Akbar Khan and supported by leftist intellectualists, including minstrel Faiz Ahmad Faiz. Although the conspiracy failed, it revealed how snappily the army had come a political actor. Ayub Khan receded himself from the plot, securing his own credibility and paving the way for his eventual dominance.
Governor- General Ghulam Muhammad and latterly Iskander Mirza leaned heavily on the army to maintain control. Mercenary politicians were seen as weak and loose, and the bureaucracy set up in the generals a dependable mate. This alliance set the stage for the 1958 achievement.
During the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with Western blocs like SEATO and CENTO , entering large quantities of military aid. The U.S. preferred dealing with generals, considering them more dependable than Pakistani politicians. This foreign backing strengthened Ayub Khan’s hand.
On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza disannulled the 1956 Constitution and assessed Martial Law, appointing General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Within weeks, still, Ayub deposed Mirza and assumed absolute control.
This was the first direct military preemption in Pakistan’s history. Ayub justified his achievement by condemning mercenary leaders for corruption, inefficiency, and insecurity. He promised order, discipline, and modernization. Though his governance brought some profitable reforms and artificial growth, it also rooted the army in politics.
Zaheer Ahmad Meer argues that Ayub’s achievement created a dangerous precedent the normalization of military intervention. Every unborn general justified their preemption by pointing to Ayub’s model.
When Ayub Khan was forced to abdicate in 1969 due to mass demurrers, power passed to General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. His term was marked by political fermentation and the 1971 war with India .
Yahya promised choices, but his incapability to manage the results of the 1970 choices where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won a maturity — led to the bifurcation of Pakistan. rather of transferring power peacefully, the governance launched military operations in East Pakistan, driving civil war.
The 1971 war ended with the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. This was the army’s topmost failure, exposing the troubles of military rule. Yet, indeed after such a disaster, the army remained central in politics.
ATTENTION: Zaheer Ahmad Meer’s “ The Generals of Pakistan ” is n't simply a chronicle of military autocrats; it's a glass reflecting the sins of Pakistan’s republic and institutions. From Ayub Khan to Musharraf, generals entered politics claiming to save Pakistan
The alternate long period of military rule came under General Muhammad Zia- ul- Haq , who overthrew Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1977.
Zia assessed martial law, executed Bhutto after a controversial trial, and ruled with an iron hand. His period was marked by suppression, repression of political parties, and mass apprehensions of opponents.
Zia introduced Sharia- grounded laws, including Hudood bills, which permanently changed Pakistan’s legal and social geography. He sought legality by presenting himself as a religious leader, not just a general.
During the Soviet irruption of Afghanistan( 1979), Zia aligned Pakistan with the United States, entering billions in aid. The war boosted Pakistan’s strategic significance but also swamped the country with munitions and unreasonableness.
Zaheer Ahmad Meer emphasizes that Zia’s programs planted seeds of unreasonableness that continue to affect Pakistan moment.
The third major military intervention came with General Pervez Musharraf’s achievement in October 1999, ousting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
Musharraf introduced reforms in media, frugality, and technology. His period saw rapid-fire growth in telecommunication, banking, and civic structure. Independent media channels flourished.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Musharraf aligned Pakistan with the U.S. “ War on Terror. ” While this brought fiscal aid, it also dragged Pakistan into internal conflict with revolutionist groups, leading to times of terrorism.
By 2007 – 08, Musharraf’s fashionability collapsed due to judicial heads, political opposition, and rising instability. He abnegated in 2008, handing power back to civilians.
Indeed after Musharraf, the service has remained important behind the scenes. Generals have continued to impact foreign policy, especially concerning India, Afghanistan, the U.S., and China. They've also shaped internal security programs through operations against terrorism.
Zaheer Ahmad Meer highlights that while mercenary governments have returned since 2008, the service’s “ shadow influence ” ensures that Pakistan remains a mongrel system, where real power is frequently participated between tagged leaders and generals.
1. Mercenary Weakness The failure of political parties to govern effectively allowed generals to step by.
2. Judicial legality Courts constantly validated accomplishments under the “ Doctrine of Necessity. ”
3. Foreign Patronage The U.S. and other powers frequently preferred dealing with generals for stability.
4. Military Self- Perception Generals saw themselves as “ savers ” of the nation, above politicians.
5. Long- Term Impact Military dominance weakened popular institutions, hindered stable governance, and contributed to repeated cycles of insecurity.
Strengthening Democracy Unless political parties come disciplined, transparent, and effective, military intervention will continue.
Civil-Military Balance The army must return to its indigenous part of defending borders, not governing.
Judicial Independence Courts must uphold the constitution without justifying unconstitutional acts.
National Unity Only a united front of strong mercenary institutions and a professional army can fulfill Jinnah’s vision.
Zaheer Ahmad Meer’s “ The Generals of Pakistan ” is n't simply a chronicle of military autocrats; it's a glass reflecting the sins of Pakistan’s republic and institutions. From Ayub Khan to Musharraf, generals entered politics claiming to save Pakistan, but their patrimonies remain controversial — some achievements overshadowed by suppression, failures, and long- term damage.
Pakistan’s survival and growth depend on breaking this cycle. The army must remain a professional defense institution, while civilians must rise to the challenge of honest, visionary governance. Only also can Pakistan realize its full eventuality as a strong, popular, and prosperous state.