Before diving into the scams, it’s essential to understand why this trade exists at all — despite clear terms of service prohibiting it.
In open-source communities, older accounts often appear more trustworthy. A profile that “joined in 2012” with 300 stars and long commit history looks like a seasoned engineer. For new developers, this can seem like an easy way to “skip the line.”
Some marketing teams and bot developers want many GitHub accounts for mass-hosting repositories, running API experiments, or manipulating stars. Because GitHub monitors suspicious activity, these users try to buy pre-verified accounts that appear legitimate.
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Some buyers claim they’re “acquiring assets” — as if GitHub accounts were business properties. In reality, GitHub profiles are tied to personal identities and can’t be legally resold without written consent and verified transfer procedures.
Finally, misinformation fuels demand. SEO-optimized “marketplaces” and Telegram channels claim the process is legal and common — when in fact, nearly all listings are fabricated.
Let’s explore what’s really happening behind those flashy offers.
| Claimed Feature | What Scammers Say | Reality |
|---|---|---|
| “Aged since 2010, 100% verified” | Long history and U.S. email verified | Date faked via cloned repos; join date can’t be changed |
| “Includes 50 repositories” | Dozens of repos included | Most are forks, not original work |
| “Phone verified” | “USA verified” for trust | GitHub doesn’t use phone verification |
| “Instant delivery” | Access in minutes | Often stolen credentials or phishing bait |
| “Replacement guarantee” | Promise of refund or replacement | Fake assurance — seller disappears after payment |
Background: In early 2025, a small software startup in India wanted an “aged GitHub profile” to boost credibility during client outreach. They found a Telegram seller advertising “2015-2018 GitHub accounts — 100% active, verified, U.S. aged.”
The Deal:
What Happened: After payment, the buyer received login credentials. They successfully logged into a GitHub account that looked legitimate — until 24 hours later, the password stopped working. GitHub had flagged the login as unauthorized; the true owner reset their access.
When the buyer contacted the seller, they were blocked immediately.
Forensic Findings:
Lesson Learned: If you didn’t create or verify the account yourself, you’ll lose control the moment GitHub’s algorithms detect suspicious login behavior. Buying stolen credentials is not just risky — it may expose your IP address and data to legal scrutiny.
Background: A U.K.-based freelancer wanted to purchase a GitHub account for managing client repositories anonymously. The seller on a marketplace site insisted on using a “secure escrow” service called EscrowDev.io.
The Deal:
What Happened: After transferring crypto, the buyer received a confirmation email and “escrow tracking ID.” A day later, both the marketplace and escrow site vanished. The domain was deleted, and the Telegram group was purged.
Investigation Results: Cyber-security researchers later discovered that EscrowDev.io was a fake website hosted on a shared server with five other scam projects. The same scammer controlled both “seller” and “escrow” identities.
Lesson Learned: Whenever a seller insists on using an exclusive escrow service, check its company registration, age of the domain, and business license. Legitimate escrow firms (like Escrow.com) have verified SSL, established corporate details, and rarely operate in crypto-only mode.
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⁑⁑ If you want to more information just contact now-
⁑⁑ 24 Hours Reply/Contact
⁑⁑ ➤WhatsApp: +1 (707) 338-9711
⁑⁑ ➤Telegram: @Usaallservice
⁑⁑ ➤Skype: Usaallservice
⁑⁑ ➤Email:usaallservice24@gmail.com
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Background: A freelancer on Upwork saw a listing for a “2014 senior developer GitHub account.” The profile looked real — full of code, followers, and commits.
The Trick:
The scammer cloned an existing GitHub profile by copying all public repositories, descriptions, and even commit messages. They created a near-identical username (alex-dev01 instead of alexdev) and took screenshots to prove “ownership.”
What Happened: After the buyer received login details, they realized the account had only two days of actual history. All commits had timestamps within 24 hours — a clear giveaway of falsification.
Lesson Learned: A real GitHub account shows a natural timeline of contribution activity: gaps, varied commit messages, and authentic follower engagement. If all commits happen in a short burst, it’s artificially generated.
To verify authenticity, use the GitHub API:
Check the created_at field — it reveals the true join date.
Background: A European AI startup wanted to acquire an “open-source team” with an active GitHub organization (5K stars). The seller offered full ownership of the organization for $1,000, claiming to include all repositories and contributors.
The Trap: The seller wasn’t the owner — just a member with limited permissions. They shared “access links” and dummy screenshots of ownership dashboards.
Outcome: When the buyer attempted to transfer ownership, GitHub support rejected the request. The true owner reported unauthorized access. The startup lost the funds, and GitHub banned their IP range for suspicious activity.
Lesson Learned: Only the organization owner can transfer GitHub org ownership. Always confirm through GitHub’s “Transfer Ownership” interface — never via credentials or third-party links. Even in legitimate mergers or acquisitions, GitHub requires signed documentation.
Background: A supposed U.S. vendor advertised “GitHub accounts verified with real U.S. phone numbers.” They claimed each account passed “two-factor SMS verification.”
Reality Check: GitHub does not use phone verification for account creation. It uses email and two-factor authentication via apps or keys, not SMS.
The scammer simply added a disposable email domain (maildrop.cc) and claimed it was “verified.” Many buyers fell for it because of the “100% U.S. verified” tagline.
Lesson Learned: If a listing mentions “phone verification” or “SMS-based GitHub verification,” it’s automatically fake. Always cross-reference the official GitHub Help pages before believing such claims.
Background: A marketing agency in Southeast Asia bought “100 fresh GitHub accounts” to host automated content and bots. They paid $500 via a Telegram vendor who promised “USA IP verified” accounts.
What Happened: All 100 accounts were created from the same IP cluster. Within days, GitHub’s anti-abuse system detected suspicious automation patterns and suspended every account. The buyer’s own corporate network was also flagged.
Lesson Learned: GitHub uses sophisticated behavioral detection (login timing, API usage, identical commit patterns). Buying bulk “verified” accounts for automation is a guaranteed path to suspension. Even if they work briefly, they’ll be shut down the moment patterns emerge.
After analyzing dozens of such scams, five major red flags appear repeatedly:
| Red Flag | Description |
|---|---|
| 1. Crypto-only payments | Scammers use Bitcoin/USDT to avoid chargebacks. |
| 2. Unrealistic prices | $20-$80 for an aged, popular GitHub profile? Impossible. |
| 3. “Proof” via screenshots | Screenshots are the easiest thing to fake. Always verify live links. |
| 4. Fake verification terms | “Phone verified,” “USA verified,” or “2FA bypassed” are invented phrases. |
| 5. Escrow exclusivity | Fake escrow or “middleman” schemes funnel you to the same scammer. |
If a listing triggers two or more of these, it’s almost certainly fraudulent.
If you’re legitimately vetting a collaborator or organization acquisition (not buying illicit accounts), you can use these safe due-diligence techniques:
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⁑⁑ If you want to more information just contact now-
⁑⁑ 24 Hours Reply/Contact
⁑⁑ ➤WhatsApp: +1 (707) 338-9711
⁑⁑ ➤Telegram: @Usaallservice
⁑⁑ ➤Skype: Usaallservice
⁑⁑ ➤Email:usaallservice24@gmail.com
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⁑⁑ https://usaallservice.com/product/buy-github-accounts/
You’ll see:
created_at: real creation datepublic_repos, followers, following: activity indicatorsDiscrepancies between claims and data = fake listing.
Legitimate developers have diverse commit activity across time. Use the contribution graph — consistent green bars over months indicate real activity, not copy-paste commits.
Ask the account owner to create a signed GPG commit on any repo. Only true owners can sign with their verified key. This is impossible for impostors.